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The authors propose a theory of task trade between 
countries that have similar relative factor endowments 
and technological capabilities but may differ in size. 
Firms produce differentiated goods by performing 
a continuum of tasks, each of which generates local 
spillovers. Tasks can be performed at home or abroad, but 
offshoring entails costs that vary by task. In equilibrium, 
the tasks with the highest offshoring costs may not be 
This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at grossman@princeton.edu. 
traded. Among the remainder, those with the relatively 
higher offshoring costs are performed in the country that 
has the higher wage and higher aggregate output. The 
paper discusses the relationship between equilibrium 
wages, equilibrium outputs, and relative country size and 
examines how the pattern of specialization reflects the key 
parameters of the model.Task Trade between Similar Countries￿
Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansbergy
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: F12, F23
Keywords: Task Trade, O⁄shoring, Fragmentation, Increasing Returns to Scale
￿We thank Aykut Ahlat￿‹ o… glu and Shlomi Kramer for research assistance, Daron Acemoglu, Sebastian Benz,
Philipp Ehrl, Gordon Hanson, Giovanni Maggi, Marc Melitz, Jens Wrona and Kei-Mu Yi for discussions and com-
ments, and the National Science Foundation (under grants SES 0211748 and SES 0451712) and Sloan Foundation
for research support. This paper was completed while Grossman was a Visiting Research Fellow in the Development
Economics Vice Presidency at the World Bank. He thanks the World Bank for support and the Trade and Integra-
tion Team (DECTI) for its hospitality. Any opinions, ￿ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of the National Science Foundation, the World
Bank Group, or any other organization.
yPrinceton University1 Introduction
Modern production assigns a prominent role to international task trade. The delivery of a good
or service to a consumer typically requires the completion of a myriad of tasks. Increasingly,
the performance of these tasks is spread across the globe, with an impressive share of o⁄shore
production in the value of many ￿nal goods. As a result, international trade is less today a matter
of countries￿specialization in particular industries and more about their specialization in particular
occupations and tasks.
Much has been written about the growth of o⁄shoring between countries that stand at di⁄erent
levels of development, i.e., countries that have dissimilar factor endowments and disparate tech-
nological capabilities.1 Yet, as important as this sort of o⁄shoring is becoming in world trade, it
pales in comparison to task trade between countries that are similar in terms of these characteris-
tics. Although aggregate data on o⁄shoring from one developed country to others are di¢ cult to
come by, we do know that most trade in intermediate goods takes place between and among the
advanced industrialized economies and that most value added generated by foreign subsidiaries of
American multinational corporations originates in other OECD countries.2 Both facts suggest that
the advanced economies are engaged in a substantial amount of international production sharing
with others at similar levels of development.
Not only does most trade ￿ ow between and among the advanced industrialized economies, but
these economies are engaging in an ever more intricate web of production-sharing arrangements.
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a case in point.3 The production of this new midsize jet involves
43 suppliers spread over 135 sites around the world. Boeing relies heavily on local expertise when
making its sourcing decisions. The wings are produced in Japan, the engines in the United Kingdom
and the United States, the ￿ aps and ailerons in Canada and Australia, the fuselage in Japan, Italy
and the United States, the horizontal stabilizers in Italy, the landing gear in France, and the doors in
Sweden and France. O⁄shore production accounts for close to 70 percent of the many thousands of
parts used to assemble the jet (Newhouse, 2007, p.29). Some parts are produced in foreign a¢ liates
of the Boeing Corporation while others are supplied under international outsourcing agreements.
The countries that perform the various tasks display no clear pattern of technological advantage.
Rather, experience and local knowledge play a central role. Apparently, expertise most often
1See, for example, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Deardor⁄ (2001), Yi (2004), Egger
and Falkinger (2003), Kohler (2004a, 2004b), and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010), as well as our own work in
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
2Many researchers have documented production sharing for particular countries in their trade with the rest of
the world; see, for example, Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii and
Yi (2001), and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005). Among these, only Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) go on to
consider the geographic nature of the production-sharing relationships. They ￿nd that North-North specialization
is the most common form of vertical specialization in world trade. The data reported in WTO and IDE-JETRO
(2011, p.84) show that intra-European and European-North American trade accounts for a large share of trade in
intermediate goods. The data in Barefoot and Mataloni (2010) reveal that nonbank multinational subsidiaries of
American parent companies hold a large fraction of their assets in other developed countries and generate a large
share of their o⁄shore value added there.
3The sourcing of Boeing￿ s parts for the 787 is detailed at http://www.boeing.com/commercial/787family
/background.html. See Newhouse (2007) for further discussion.
1derives from similar tasks being performed for other Boeing projects or for related industries, such
as military aviation and automobile production.4
In this paper, we formulate a theory of task trade between countries that have similar exogenous
sources of comparative advantage but di⁄er in size. In our model, the supply of any good requires
a ￿xed input of managerial e⁄ort plus the completion of a continuum of production tasks. The set
of required tasks is the same for all goods, yet the resulting products are di⁄erentiated in the eyes
of consumers. Producers of the ￿nal goods engage in monopolistic competition and sell their wares
to consumers who hold constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences. We explore the links
between country size and the pattern of specialization and task trade.
The Boeing Dreamliner example can help us to contrast our notion of a ￿task￿with the com-
monly used concept of an intermediate good. In our formulation, a task is the ￿nest possible
addition to the value added of a good or service done by a particular factor of production. Of
course, actual international trade transactions in general involve bundles of tasks that ￿t the de-
scription of an intermediate good. Thus, a theory of task trade can be understood as a theory
in which the characteristics of the bundles of tasks forming intermediate goods are determined
endogenously depending on the cost of o⁄shoring each task. The ￿ wings￿of the Dreamliner may
be produced in Japan, but the particular composition of the wing￿ whether it includes assembly,
testing, and painting, for example￿ is not technologically pre-determined, but rather is part of the
deliberate production design by Boeing.
In keeping with the anecdotal evidence cited above, our treatment of production sharing em-
phasizes the role of local knowledge and specialized expertise. Our approach shares with the ￿new
trade theory￿a focus on increasing returns to scale as a force that induces concentration of pro-
duction. But whereas the most familiar models in that literature feature trade in ￿nal goods￿ for
which scale economies internal to the ￿rm may be most pertinent￿ our focus on task trade dictates
a di⁄erent approach. The expertise to produce a unique good may well reside in a single ￿rm,
but the expertise to perform a narrow task rarely does so. Rather, it is often embodied in a pool
of specialized labor, be they engineers with speci￿c training or workers with shared experience.
This suggests that, in the absence of complete contracts, localized knowledge at the task level may
re￿ ect external economies of scale rather than (or in addition to) internal economies. We take this
notion to the extreme by assuming that productivity in performing a task varies with the frequency
with which it is performed in a particular location, irrespective of the identify of the ￿rm or ￿rms
performing the function.
The location of each task balances two competing forces. On the one hand, the external
economies of scale provide ￿rms with an incentive to locate each task in the country where others
are performing it. On the other hand, it is costly for ￿rms to organize and monitor the performance
of tasks in countries di⁄erent from where their headquarters are located. Our model features het-
erogeneous o⁄shoring costs to capture the reality that some tasks are easier to separate from ￿rms￿
headquarters than others. For example, routine tasks can be performed remotely at relatively little
4See ￿A Cleverer Way to Build a Boeing,￿The Financial Times, 07/08/2007.
2extra cost, because instructions can be expressed unambiguously and conveyed easily to workers,
with little need for interaction with central management. Other tasks may require greater adapta-
tion to circumstances, so proximity to headquarters may be more important.5 Our analysis links
the pattern of specialization by task to the distribution of o⁄shoring costs.
When small ￿rms operate in an environment with external economies of scale, they face an
obvious coordination problem. If other ￿rms are performing an activity in some location, it may be
most pro￿table to join them there, even if all other economic forces point to a di⁄erent outcome.
As a result of the potential coordination failures, multiple equilibria can arise. Multiplicity of
equilibrium has plagued models with production externalities, where ￿history￿and ￿expectations￿
play a role in determining ￿nal outcomes. With a continuum of tasks and the possibility for
self-ful￿lling expectations for each of them, it might appear that little could be said about the
equilibrium allocation of tasks across countries. Yet the environment with many tasks suggests a
solution to the coordination problem that narrows the set of equilibria dramatically. In particular,
we recognize that ￿rms can perform tasks on behalf of others. The opportunity for a ￿rm to perform
a task for many producers means that it potentially can internalize the externalities of locational
choice. Such a supplier need not be large in relation to its industry, because even if it dominates
the performance of a particular task, there are many other tasks to be done. By introducing the
possibility for outsourcing tasks, we can cut through the coordination issues and say quite a lot
about the pattern of specialization in equilibrium.6 Our approach then suggests that in the presence
of local externalities and global trade the scope for multiplicity will be narrowed by outsourcing,
because it allows agents to pro￿t from any coordination failures that might otherwise arise.
Our main proposition relates the pattern of specialization by task to equilibrium relative wages
and equilibrium aggregate outputs. It states that all ￿rms perform the tasks that are most costly
to o⁄shore in the country of their headquarters. Among the remaining tasks, those that are easiest
to o⁄shore concentrate in the country that has lower wages and lesser aggregate output, while those
that are more di¢ cult to o⁄shore concentrate in the country that has higher wages and greater
aggregate output. Depending on the overall level of o⁄shoring costs, the general equilibrium may be
unique or not. With o⁄shoring costs su¢ ciently high that identical-sized countries would engage in
no production sharing, the unique equilibrium with unequal-sized countries has higher wages in the
larger country. When o⁄shoring costs are not so high, there will be multiple equilibria in a world
with countries of nearly identical size, but a unique equilibrium when country sizes diverge. In
the former case, there is one equilibrium in which wages are higher in the (slightly) larger country,
another in which wages are higher in the (slightly) smaller country, and a third equilibrium with
equal wages. In the latter case, the (much) larger country enjoys the higher wages.
We are not aware of other e⁄orts to explain the pattern of task trade between similar countries
5Autor et al. (2003) have emphasized this distinction between routine and non-routine tasks and provided a
measure of this concept. Levy and Murnane (2004) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have applied the
concept to explain variation in the costs of o⁄shoring.
6As we argue in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), a similar set of assumptions can also be used in a context
with only ￿nal goods to eliminate equilibrium multiplicity.
3in the nascent literature on o⁄shoring. Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982) were the ￿rst
to explore the determinants of the trade pattern in general-equilibrium settings with Marshallian
production externalities.7 Although their results are super￿cially similar to ours, the underlying
economics are quite di⁄erent. In their models, stability (and e¢ ciency) dictate concentration of the
increasing-returns industry in a single country. The smaller country may lack su¢ cient resources to
satisfy world demand for this good, even if it is completely specialized, whereas the larger country
always can do so.8 In our context of task trade, the ability to accommodate world demand never
is at issue, because any small task can easily be concentrated in either location. The pattern of
specialization does not rest on country size per se, but rather on the interplay between the scale of
aggregate production of ￿nal goods and the o⁄shoring costs.
Our results resemble some in the literature on market-size e⁄ects.9 In both cases, locational
advantages give rise to factor-price di⁄erences, as the country that bears higher transport costs
must o⁄set this disadvantage in order that its factors be fully employed. In the literature on the
home-market e⁄ect, scale economies are internal to the ￿rm and cost di⁄erences stem solely from
market size. In contrast, external economies of scale seem more pertinent for modeling production
sharing. The recognition of such externalities requires us to address coordination issues and the role
of producers who potentially can internalize these bene￿ts. Also, for task trade, the scale of ￿nal-
goods production and not the location of ￿nal demand determines the pattern of specialization. The
country that produces more ￿nal goods need not be the one with the greater factor endowments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our model of
o⁄shoring, discuss the equilibrium allocation of tasks given factor prices and aggregate outputs,
and lay out the conditions for a general equilibrium. Section 3 studies the general equilibrium of the
model and discusses uniqueness of equilibrium and other equilibrium properties. The section pro-
ceeds to a discussion of the relationship between country size, aggregate output of ￿nal goods, and
relative wages, and presents our main result on the pattern of specialization. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Production requires many ￿tasks.￿ Each task can be performed close to a ￿rm￿ s national head-
quarters or at a foreign location. If a task is performed o⁄shore, the ￿rm bears an extra cost of
coordinating production and communicating with distant workers. The cost of o⁄shoring varies
by task. Some tasks require more frequent and intense interaction between workers and managers,
while others are easier to perform from a distance.
We study an environment with external economies at the task level. A ￿rm￿ s productivity in
performing a task in a particular location increases with the total scale of performance of the task
7See, also, Melvin (1969) for an early contribution and Helpman (1984) for a survey and further discussion.
8In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), we study a trade model with Marshallian externalities in a continuum of
￿nal-goods industries. In such a setting, country size plays no role in determining the chain of comparative advantage.
It does, however, a⁄ect the cut-o⁄ between goods that are produced in each country.
9See Krugman (1980) for an early contribution and Hanson and Xiang (2004) for a study of market-size e⁄ects in
an economy with many industries and heterogeneous transport costs.
4by all ￿rms in that same location. As in the literature on increasing returns to scale at the industry
level, the external economies are meant to capture the presence of localized knowledge spillovers.10
There are two countries, East and West. Each country is endowed with ￿xed supplies of two
primary factors, managers and workers. In East, the supplies of these factors are H and L, re-
spectively; in West, they are H￿ and L￿. The similarity of the two countries is re￿ ected in their
identical relative factor supplies and identical technological capabilities . Although H=L = H￿=L￿,
the sizes of the two countries typically will not be the same.
A producer must perform (or procure) a unit measure of tasks to generate ￿nal output. The
set of tasks that is performed by di⁄erent producers is the same, but their resulting outputs are
di⁄erentiated in the eyes of consumers. Let ￿ > 1 be the elasticity of substitution between any pair
of ￿nal products. The world market for these consumption goods is characterized by monopolistic
competition, with (constant) mark-up pricing and zero pro￿ts. We abstract from any cost of
transporting ￿nal goods in order to highlight the costliness of o⁄shoring.
The tasks that comprise a ￿rm￿ s variable cost are performed by workers alone. A ￿rm can
perform a task locally or o⁄shore, and it can do so either in-house or by outsourcing the task
to another ￿rm. Before incurring any production (or procurement) costs, each ￿rm must hire
managers to oversee production and coordinate the performance of the various tasks. A ￿rm
requires f managers in the country of its headquarters as a ￿xed cost of doing business.
We model the siting of each task as a two-stage game. After a set of ￿rms has borne the ￿xed
cost of entry, market participants engage in a location-and-pricing stage, when each ￿rm locates
its productive capacity for each task i and posts a set of prices at which it is willing to perform
the task for others. Since the tasks are performed on behalf of particular ￿nal producers, we allow
for price discrimination; that is, a ￿rm may quote one price to perform the task on behalf of other
￿rms headquartered in East and a di⁄erent price to perform the task for ￿rms headquartered in
West.11 These price quotes include any o⁄shoring costs (which are described further below). In
the subsequent, production stage, each ￿rm decides whether to perform each task in house, in
the location that it previously selected, or whether to contract for the task under an outsourcing
arrangement. The make-or-buy decisions are made simultaneously by all producers. We con￿ne
attention to sub-game perfect equilibria of this two-stage game.
There are external economies in the performance of every task. These economies generate
national increasing returns to scale. Suppose that task i is performed a total of Xij times in some
country j. Then a ￿rm that has its headquarters in country j and that chooses country j as its
location for task i can perform the task in-house with 1=A(Xij) workers per unit of output, where
A(￿) is positive, increasing, concave, and limX!1 A0 (X) = 0. The labor requirement is the same
when a ￿rm performs the task for itself or on behalf of another. If a ￿rm performs task i in country
j for a producer (itself or another) with headquarters in country j0 6= j, then it bears the higher
10On this point, see for example the discussions in Marshall (1920), Helpman (1984), Romer (1986), and Lucas
(2002), among many others.
11It could quote a richer set of prices, but since the ￿rms headquartered in a given location are symmetric, it has
no reason for doing so.
5per unit labor requirement ￿t(i)=A(Xij). Here, ￿t(i) > 1 re￿ ects the cost of o⁄shoring task i.
Our modeling of o⁄shoring costs mirrors that in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The
schedule t(i) captures the heterogeneity of these costs across tasks. We index tasks so that t0(i) > 0.
Tasks with low indexes are those for which instructions can be communicated internationally with
little loss of information. In contrast, remote performance of tasks with high indexes is problematic,
because these tasks must be monitored closely by headquarters and require intensive interaction
between managers and workers. The parameter ￿ is a technological parameter that re￿ ects the
state of communications technology and other technological conditions that determine the ease of
coordinating economic activities across countries.
The outcomes of the location-and-production games for all of the tasks give each ￿rm its per-
unit cost of ￿nal output. Firms mark up their costs to maximize pro￿ts. The general equilibrium
determines the measure of producers in each country, the outputs and prices of all varieties of the
￿nal good, and the factor prices in each country.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the siting of each task i 2 [0;1], taking the numbers
of di⁄erentiated products, the aggregate output levels, and the factor prices in each country as
given. In Section 2.3, we link the quantities and prices to the locations of the various tasks, thereby
completing the conditions for a general equilibrium.
2.1 Location of Tasks
Suppose there are n ￿rms headquartered in East and n￿ ￿rms headquartered in West. All ￿rms
generate their output by performing or procuring a continuum of tasks. We focus on some particular
task i and ask where the ￿rms locate their capacities for performing this task and whether they
ultimately perform it for themselves or engage in outsourcing. In addressing the citing of capacities
for a particular task i and the associated make-or-buy decisions, we take the per-￿rm output levels
x and x￿ and the wage rates w and w￿ in East and West, respectively, as given. If the n Eastern
￿rms each produce x units of ￿nal output, then task i must be performed a total of nx times by
these ￿rms or by others on their behalf. Similarly, task i must be performed n￿x￿ times by or on
behalf of the Western producers. Following the discussion above, we de￿ne a location equilibrium
for task i as follows.
De￿nition 1 Given n;n￿;x;x￿;w; and w￿, a location equilibrium for task i is a set of ￿rm-speci￿c
capacity location choices (East or West) and price pairs (price for Eastern ￿rms and price for
Western ￿rms) in the ￿rst stage, and a set of procurement choices (self-procure or buy from a
particular seller) in the second stage, such that these strategies constitute a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium of the two-stage game.
De￿nition 1 rules out, of course, any placements of task i or any subsequent procurement
decisions that allow for a pro￿table deviation by some ￿rm. In order to characterize the location
equilibrium for all of the tasks in the unit interval, we ￿rst derive a trio of thresholds that identify
6the sets of tasks that are immune to certain types of deviations. Then, in Proposition 1 below, we
use these thresholds to characterize a location equilibrium for each task i 2 [0;1].
We will see that the pricing competition is standard and familiar from Bertrand models. The
novel element here concerns the capacity location choices. In general, a prospective equilibrium
with all ￿rms placing their capacities for task i in some location is susceptible to two types of
deviations. First, some ￿rm might locate in the opposite country and price in such a way as to
attract as customers all ￿rms (and only ￿rms) that have their headquarters there. We shall refer
to this strategy as a local deviation inasmuch as the deviant pursues only local sales in the country
where it locates. Second, a deviant might locate its capacity for task i in the opposite location
and price in such a way as to attract all ￿rms worldwide as outsourcing customers. We shall refer
to this strategy as a global deviation. For any conceivable location equilibrium with concentrated
placement of task i, we must check that neither a local deviation nor a global deviation is pro￿table.
If a task cannot be concentrated in East or in West￿ due to the existence of pro￿table deviation
opportunities of some sort￿ then we must entertain the possibility that Eastern ￿rms locate their
capacity for that task in East and Western ￿rms do so in West. Again, we allow for alternative
pricing strategies that involve competing for (only) local sales and competing for global sales.
Let us explore ￿rst the possibility that all ￿rms locate their capacity to perform task i in East.
If each ￿rm expects the others to locate similarly, Bertrand competition leads them to price at
expected cost. Let p
j
i be the price posted by a typical ￿rm for performing task i for another that










where w is the wage in East, x is ￿nal output of a typical Eastern producer, and symbols with
asterisks are the corresponding variables for West. Note that if task i is concentrated in East, it
will be performed there a total number of nx + n￿x￿ times, so A(nx + n￿x￿) is the anticipated
productivity of any ￿rm performing the task there. Note too that the price quoted to Western
￿rms includes the anticipated cost of o⁄shoring, since a subcontractor with its capacity for task i
in East will incur such a cost if it performs the task on behalf of a ￿rm headquartered in West.
Now consider a local deviation by a ￿rm that instead locates its capacity for task i in West.
Let the deviant quote the prices ~ pE
i = 1 and ~ pW
i = pW
i ￿ ￿, for some small ￿. At these prices,
the deviant will attract as second-stage customers all of the Western ￿rms but none of the Eastern
￿rms, and so it will achieve a scale of n￿x￿ and a productivity of A(n￿x￿). This local deviation
























7The minimum and maximum in (1) guarantee that I = 0 if no task can be concentrated in East
without threat that a deviant ￿rm would switch its location in order to serve Western ￿rms, and
that I = 1 if all tasks are immune to local deviations of this sort. Equation (1) provides a limit on
what tasks can be concentrated in East. For i > I, the o⁄shoring costs are too high relative to the
potential productivity gains from a greater scale of production, A(nx + n￿x￿)=A(n￿x￿), and the
bene￿t or cost of any di⁄erences in wages, w￿=w, to support an equilibrium with capacities for task
i concentrated in East. The threshold task I (if internal) is the task that is equally costly to perform
for all Western ￿rms in East at productivity A(nx + n￿x￿), or in West at productivity A(n￿x￿).
Clearly, the threshold I decreases with the relative wage w=w￿, increases with aggregate output nx
in the East, and decreases with aggregate output n￿x￿ in West.12 An increase in aggregate output
in East reduces the attractiveness of ￿going it alone￿in West, whereas an increase in aggregate
output in West makes such a strategy more palatable.
Next consider a global deviation by some ￿rm when all others locate task i in East. Under this
strategy, the deviant prices so as to be able to perform the task at global scale; i.e., it undercuts
the prices set by the others in the conjectured equilibrium (which equal their expected costs of
self-provision). By setting prices ~ pE
i = pE
i ￿ ￿ and ~ pW
i = pW
i ￿ ￿, the deviant can sell to everyone
and achieve the productivity A(nx + n￿x￿). The global deviation will be pro￿table if

















considering that the deviant will need to pay o⁄shoring costs for serving Eastern ￿rms but not for
serving Western ￿rms.















Suppose for concreteness that w > w￿; i.e., that East is the country with the higher wage rate. We
prove the following lemma.13
Lemma 1 If w > w￿, either (i) ~ ￿(i) > 0 or ~ ￿(i) < 0 for all i, or (ii) J > 0 and ~ ￿(i) > 0 for i < J
while ~ ￿(i) < 0 for i > J.
Hence, i ￿ J is necessary for concentration of task i in the high-wage East.14 If interior, the
threshold J is the task for which concentrated performance in East yields the same aggregate cost
as concentration in West. For this task, a global deviation is marginally unpro￿table, because a
deviant cannot achieve any cost savings by switching locations. The threshold J increases with
w=w￿, because a higher relative wage in East raises the relative cost of performing tasks there. The
threshold also increases with n￿x￿, because the greater the aggregate output in West the greater are
12The last statment follows from the fact that A(￿) is increasing and concave.
13Proofs of the three lemmas are provided in an Online Appendix.
14If East were the low-wage country, the necessary condition would instead be i ￿ J.
8the o⁄shoring costs that result from performing a task in East. By similar reasoning, the threshold
J declines with nx.
If neither a local deviation nor the global deviation is pro￿table for some task i, then there
exists a location equilibrium in which all ￿rms site that task in East. Evidently, the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for this are i ￿ I and i ￿ J.
Now consider the possibility that all ￿rms locate their capacity to perform task i in West. By
analogous reasoning, a deviant might locate in East with the intention of serving only Eastern ￿rms







where the left-hand side is the per-unit cost of serving the Eastern ￿rms from East and the right-
hand side is what they expect to pay by o⁄shoring this task in West. We can express a necessary

















The threshold task I￿, if interior, is the one that is equally costly to perform for all Eastern ￿rms in
East or in West, considering that the former avoids o⁄shoring costs but sacri￿ces scale economies.
This threshold increases with w=w￿, because the relative cost of performing tasks in East increases
with the relative wage there. I￿ increases with n￿x￿ and declines with nx, inasmuch as the former
expands the bene￿t to Eastern ￿rms from joining the others in West whereas the latter reduces the
cost of ￿going it alone￿in East.
When all ￿rms locate task i in West, a global deviation will be pro￿table if ￿~ ￿ (i) > 0; i.e., if the
task can be performed at lesser total cost in East than in West. Again assuming for concreteness
that w ￿ w￿, we can write the necessary condition as i ￿ J, where J is de￿ned as before. The
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of a location equilibrium for task i with all ￿rms
concentrated in West are i ￿ I￿ and i ￿ J.
Now consider Figure 1(a), which shows one possible ordering of the threshold tasks I;I￿, and J.
The ￿gure is drawn under the assumption that w > w￿. We have seen that there exists a location
equilibrium for each task i 2 [0;J] in which the task is concentrated in West and performed there
by or on behalf of all ￿rms. There exists no location equilibrium with concentration in East for
any task in this range, because such an outcome would be undermined by a global deviation. For
a task with index i 2 (J;I), there exists a location equilibrium with concentration in East, but
none with concentration in West, because the latter allocation would be susceptible to a global
deviation. Finally, a task with index i > I cannot be concentrated in East or in West in the
location-and-pricing stage, because a local deviation would undermine either such placement. For
such a task, we must now examine the possibility that Eastern ￿rms site their capacities in East
and Western ￿rms do so in West.
9 
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Suppose that all ￿rms locate their capacities for task i in the country of their headquarters
and that all ￿rms price with the intention of serving only ￿rms that share their country of origin.
Let the Eastern ￿rms quote the price pE
i = w=A(nx) for outsourcing task i to other Eastern ￿rms,
while setting a prohibitive price for ￿rms in West. Similarly, let the Western ￿rms quote the price
pW
i = w￿=A(n￿x￿) to other Western ￿rms but a prohibitive price for serving those headquartered in
East. With these locations and prices, the subsequent production pattern is dispersed; the Eastern
￿rms perform or procure the task in East, while the Western ￿rms do so in West. A postulated
equilibrium with dispersed production of task i is susceptible to a deviation by a ￿rm that locates
in East and prices to achieve global scale or by one that locates in West and does similarly. It is
readily seen that performing task i in East with prices just below those indicated above will be
pro￿table if i < I and that performing the task in West at such prices will be pro￿table if i < I￿.
Therefore, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of an equilibrium for task i with
dispersed locations and production are i ￿ I and i ￿ I￿.
We return to Figure 1(a). We previously identi￿ed (concentrated) location equilibria for all
tasks with i 2 [0;I] and we have now veri￿ed that a location equilibrium with dispersed capacity
locations and task performance exists for all tasks i 2 [I;1]. Therefore, we have established the
existence of a location equilibrium for every task in the unit interval for the case of J < I￿ < I,
and we have ruled out alternative sitings of any task except those at the thresholds. In the location
equilibria that we have just described, every producer is indi⁄erent between performing any task
in house or procuring it via outsourcing. But the country in which each task is performed by (or
for) every ￿rm is fully determined.
10Now consider Figure 1(b), which depicts an alternative ordering of I;I￿ and J. By familiar
reasoning, there exists a location equilibrium for all tasks i 2 [0;I￿] that has concentrated capacity
location and task performance in West. For these tasks (except the threshold task I￿), concentration
in East would be undermined by a local deviation. Tasks with i 2 [J;I] have a location equilibrium
with concentration in East, but those in the interior of this interval cannot be concentrated in West.
And for tasks with index i 2 [I;1]; there exists a location equilibrium with dispersed location and
production. But note that none of these outcomes is possible for any task i 2 (I￿;J). For a task in
this range, if all ￿rms were to locate capacity in East, a global deviation to West would be pro￿table.
But if all ￿rms were to locate in West, a local deviation to East would be pro￿table. And, since
i < I, if all ￿rms were to locate in the country of their headquarters and price to serve only their
compatriots, an Eastern ￿rm could pro￿tably deviate by pricing to capture sales to Western ￿rms.
Evidently, for any task i 2 (I￿;J), there is no location equilibrium with concentrated location and
production and no equilibrium with dispersed location and production.
But there is a further possibility that we have yet to consider. Suppose that all ￿rms locate
capacity for task i 2 [I￿;J] in the country of their headquarters. Let the Eastern ￿rms price at










Let the Western ￿rms price to compete only for local sales; i.e., they set a price equal to w￿=A(n￿x￿)
for sales to Western ￿rms and a prohibitive price for sales to Eastern ￿rms. In the subsequent
production stage, each Western ￿rm prefers to procure task i from one of its Eastern counterparts
than to perform it in-house or to procure from another ￿rm in West. Clearly, no Eastern ￿rm has
an incentive to deviate, because all ￿rms are pricing at cost. As for the Western ￿rms, a deviant
must price below pE
i in order to attract sales from East. If it did so, it could not cover the associated
losses with any pro￿ts on sales to fellow Western ￿rms, because these other ￿rms have the option to
self-provide and they can perform the task for themselves at the same cost as could the deviant.15
If the deviant ￿rm were to price above the anticipated cost of serving ￿rms in West, it would ￿nd
no takers for its o⁄er.
Evidently, there exists a location equilibrium for any task i 2 [I￿;J] that has dispersed location
of capacities but concentrated production. For tasks in this range, Eastern ￿rms locate capacity in
East and either self-provide or procure from another Eastern ￿rm, whereas Western ￿rms locate in
West but ultimately procure the task from an Eastern ￿rm under an outsourcing arrangement.
Using a similar approach, we can now describe the location equilibrium for every task under all
possible orderings of the threshold tasks. We do so with the aid of Figure 2, which is drawn under
the assumption that w > w￿. In the appendix, we prove:
15The fact that a Western ￿rm pricing at p
E
i = w=A(nx + n
￿x
￿) ￿ " su⁄ers losses on its sales to Eastern ￿rms
follows directly from the fact that i > I
￿. Even if productivity in East were only A(nx), it would be more costly to
serve these ￿rms from West than from East, based on the de￿nition of I
￿ in (3). A fortiori, it is more costly to serve
them from the West when the Eastern cost re￿ ects the productivity of global scale.
11Lemma 2 If w > w￿, then J < I implies I > I￿.
This lemma rules out the possibility that I;I￿ and J are ordered such that J < I < I￿. The ￿gure
depicts the remaining ￿ve possible orderings of the threshold tasks.
Figure 2(a) reproduces the ordering of Figure 1(a). As we have seen, the tasks with the lowest
o⁄shoring costs have concentrated location and production in the low-wage West. These tasks
are indicated in the ￿gure by Wc (where the superscript c denotes that for these tasks capacity
and production are concentrated in West). The tasks with intermediate o⁄shoring costs have
concentrated location and production in the high-wage East and are indicated by Ec. And the
tasks with the highest o⁄shoring costs have dispersed location and production, as indicated by D.
Figure 2: Location Equilibrium for All Tasks 
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12Similarly, Figure 2(b) reproduces the ordering of Figure 1(b). There are ranges with concen-
trated location and production in East and in West, and a range with dispersed location and
production. In addition, there is a range of tasks with i 2 (I￿;J) for which location is dispersed
but production is concentrated in East. We denote this range by Eo, to indicate that they are
performed in East, but with o⁄shore outsourcing by ￿rms in West.
The remaining panels can be understood similarly. When I￿ < I < J, as in Figure 2(c),
some tasks are performed only in West and some only in East, but Western ￿rms never locate
their capacity for any task in East. When I < I￿, there is no task that is performed only in
East. In Figure 2(d), Eastern ￿rms do locate their capacity in East for tasks with i 2 (J;I￿), but
they outsource the performance of these task to Western partners in the subsequent, production
stage (region Wo). In Figure 2(e), tasks with low o⁄shoring costs have location and production
concentrated in West, while those with high o⁄shoring costs have location and production dispersed.
In what follows, we denote by E ￿ Ec [ Eo and W ￿ Wc [ Wo the sets of all tasks performed
in East and West, respectively.16 We summarize the allocation of tasks to countries more formally
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose w > w￿ and that I; I￿ and J are de￿ned by (1), (3) and (2), respectively.
Then:
(i) If I ￿ I￿, performance of every task i 2 Wc = [0;minfI￿;Jg) is concentrated in West,
performance of every task i 2 E = (minfI￿;Jg;I) is concentrated in East, and performance of
every task i 2 D = (I;1] is dispersed. Moreover, if I￿ < J, each Western ￿rm outsources the
performance of every task i 2 Eo = (I￿;minfJ;Ig) to some Eastern ￿rm.
(ii) If I < I￿, performance of every task i 2 W = [0;I￿) is concentrated in West and perfor-
mance of every task i 2 D = (I￿;1] is dispersed. Moreover if J < I￿, each Eastern ￿rm outsources
the performance of tasks i 2 Wo = (J;I) to some Western ￿rm.
We conclude this section with a comment about the pattern of specialization revealed by Figure
2 and described in Proposition 1. Recall that we have arbitrarily tabbed West as the low-wage
country. For all possible orderings of I;I￿ and J, the set of tasks performed in West has lower
o⁄shoring costs than the set of tasks performed in East, which in turn has lower o⁄shoring costs
than the set that is dispersed. After we develop the conditions for a general equilibrium, we will
(in Proposition 6) tie this pattern of specialization to the relative amounts of ￿nal output produced
in each country.
16We characterize the location of tasks using only open intervals so as to exclude the boundaries of the sets de￿ned
by the thresholds I; I
￿; and J. At these boundaries there can be two sub-game perfect equilibria of the location
game. Since this only happens in a set of measure zero that contains a maximum of three points in the set [0;1];
the multiplicity of outcomes at the boundaries is irrelevant for the general equilibrium of the model or any of our
substantive results.
132.2 E¢ ciency of Task Allocation
In this section, we characterize the e¢ cient allocation of tasks given wages and aggregate outputs,
and describe the ine¢ ciencies inherent in the market allocation.
It is clear from the symmetry of the various ￿rms headquartered in a country that an e¢ cient
allocation requires all Western ￿rms to perform (or procure) a given task in the same location,
and that Eastern ￿rms should do likewise. The remaining issues that must be addressed are (i)
whether performance of a task i should be concentrated or dispersed, and (ii) if concentrated, in
which country it should be performed. We begin with the latter question ￿rst.
If performance of task i is concentrated in a country, the productivity with which it is performed
is A(nx + n￿x￿) no matter which location is chosen. The total cost of performing the task inclusive














if performed in West. The former exceeds the latter if and only if i < J, where J is de￿ned in (2).
In other words, if J is interior in [0;1], then task J can be performed at the same aggregate cost
in either location. Considering the di⁄erent scales of ￿nal output in the two countries, tasks with
smaller o⁄shoring costs than J are more cheaply performed in the low-wage West, and tasks with
higher o⁄shoring costs than J are more cheaply performed in the high-wage East.
Now consider the e¢ cient choice of concentration versus dispersion. Let us compare the option
of concentrated performance of task i in East with the option of serving Eastern ￿rms from East













or i < ^ I, where ^ I is de￿ned by

























By comparing (1) and (4), we see that ^ I > I; i.e., the marginal task that is immune to a pro￿table
local deviation by Western ￿rms has a lower o⁄shoring cost than the marginal task that can be
more cheaply performed only in East compared to the alternative of dispersed production. This
re￿ ects the fact that a local deviant siting its capacity in West can pro￿t from sales to Western ￿rms
without taking into account the negative externality that its action imposes on Eastern ￿rms. We
can de￿ne analogously a task ^ I￿ such that the aggregate cost of concentrating task ^ I￿ in West equals
the aggregate cost of performing the task in dispersed locations. By similar reasoning, ^ I￿ > I￿.
14The e¢ cient allocation is readily characterized. Tasks with i > maxf^ I; ^ I￿g are optimally dis-
persed; Eastern ￿rms should be served from East and Western ￿rms from West. Among the rest,
those with i < J (if any) are optimally concentrated in West and those with i > J are optimally
concentrated in East.
It should now be apparent that, in general, the equilibrium allocation exhibits two types of
ine¢ ciency. First, the margin between concentration and dispersion generates too little o⁄shoring
relative to what would be globally e¢ cient. In equilibrium, the tasks with i > maxfI;I￿g are
dispersed, whereas it is e¢ cient to separate performance of only those tasks with i > maxf^ I; ^ I￿g.
Since ^ I > I and ^ I￿ > I￿, the equilibrium has dispersed tasks that optimally would be concentrated.
This ine¢ ciency re￿ ects the negative externality that producers in one country impose on those in
the other when they choose to ￿go it alone.￿
Second, e¢ ciency requires that the division of tasks concentrated in West versus East be gov-
erned by J. The same is true of the equilibrium allocation in Figure 2(a), but not so in Figures 2(b),
2(c), or 2(d). In each of these latter cases, there exists a range of tasks that optimally would be
concentrated in one country, but concentration there is undermined by a pro￿table local deviation
to the other. Instead, these tasks are concentrated in the ￿wrong￿country, with ￿rms in the other
locations served by outsourcing. Take, for example, the tasks i 2 (I￿;J) in Figure 2(b). Since
i < J, it would be less costly to perform these tasks in West than in East. But these tasks are not
performed in West in the equilibrium, because a deviant would move the task to East and attract
other Eastern producers as customers. Instead, performance of the task is concentrated in East,
with Western ￿rms served by their Eastern counterparts.
We summarize our discussion of the e¢ ciency of task allocation in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) For any task in D that lies in the interval (maxfI;I￿g;maxf^ I; ^ I￿g) aggregate
cost would be reduced by concentrating production in some country. (ii) Aggregate cost would be
reduced by concentrating production of tasks i 2 Eo in West and of tasks i 2 Wo in East.
2.3 General Equilibrium
In Section 2.1 we described the location of every task for given n;n￿;x;x￿;w; and w￿. Of course,
the locations of the various tasks a⁄ect costs, pro￿tability, and factor demands. Therefore, the
equilibrium numbers of ￿rms in each country, the per-￿rm output levels, and the factor prices
are in turn functions of where the various tasks are performed. In this section, we provide the
remaining requirements for a general equilibrium. These conditions are more familiar. They re￿ ect
the fact that ￿rms practice mark-up pricing, relative outputs match relative demands, free entry
drives pro￿ts to zero, and factor markets clear in every country.
Let c and c￿ denote the unit cost of a typical ￿nal good for a ￿rm headquartered in East and
West, respectively. As de￿ned before, E denotes the set of tasks performed only in East, including
those (if any) that are performed by Eastern ￿rms on behalf of Western counterparts. Similarly,
W represents the set of tasks performed only in West (including Wo). D denotes the set of tasks
15that are performed locally by ￿rms in both countries. All tasks in E represent o⁄shoring for ￿rms
headquartered in West, while tasks in W represent o⁄shoring for ￿rms headquartered in East.
There is no o⁄shoring of the tasks in D. In view of the costs of o⁄shoring and the di⁄erent scales






















where M(Z) is the Lebesgue measure of Z for Z = fE;W;Dg and T(Z) ￿
R
i2Z ￿t(i)di for Z = E
and W. So T (Z)=A(nx+n￿x￿) is the total amount of labor per unit of output needed to perform
the tasks in Z for an o⁄shore ￿rm when labor productivity is A(nx+n￿x￿).17 In (5), the three terms
are the total per-unit cost to a ￿rm headquartered in East of the tasks that are performed only
in East, the tasks that are performed only in West, and the tasks that are dispersed, respectively.
The interpretation of (6) is similar.
Given c and c￿, the ￿rms practice mark-up pricing. This yields, via the demand functions, a
relationship between relative costs of Eastern and Western ￿rms and relative quantities produced







where, as de￿ned before, ￿ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties.
Free entry drives variable pro￿ts to the level of ￿xed costs, which are sf for a ￿rm headquartered
in East and s￿f for a ￿rm headquartered in West, where s and s￿ are the salaries of managers in
East and West, respectively. By familiar calculations, the zero-pro￿t conditions imply
s =
cx





f (￿ ￿ 1)
: (9)
Finally, we have the factor-market clearing conditions. Managers are employed only in head-
quarters, where they perform activities that are independent of scale. In each country f managers
are needed per ￿rm, which implies
nf = H (10)
17We assume E, W, and D are elements of the Borel ￿￿algebra and that t(￿) is Lebesgue measurable. For the case
in which w 6= w
￿, we will ￿nd that the sets E, W, and D are connected intervals, so the integral that de￿nes T (￿) is a
standard Riemann integral. If w = w
￿; the theory imposes no structure on the sets E and W (D is still a connected
interval). In this case, we restrict attention to sets E and W that are elements of the Borel ￿-algebra and use the
Lebesgue integral. Of course, this restriction has no e⁄ect on the general equilibrium properties of our economy.
16and
n￿f = H￿. (11)
Workers in each country are employed in tasks that are performed locally by national ￿rms and
in a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms. Tasks in E do not use any Western labor and tasks in W do not
use any Eastern labor. Considering the demands by local and foreign ￿rms for the tasks that are



















n￿x￿ = L￿. (13)
The three terms on the right-hand side of (12) are, respectively, the labor employed in East to
perform concentrated tasks (tasks in E) by or on behalf of Eastern ￿rms, the labor employed in
East to perform concentrated tasks by or on behalf of Western ￿rms, and the labor employed by
Eastern ￿rms in tasks that are not traded (tasks in D). The interpretation of the terms in (13) is
analogous.
Let w￿ = 1 be the numeraire. Then, a general equilibrium is de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 2 A general equilibrium comprises numbers of ￿rms, n and n￿, output levels, x and
x￿, unit costs, c and c￿, managers￿wages, s and s￿, and the relative workers￿wage w, as well as
capacity location and procurement decisions, Ec, Eo, Wc, Wo, and D, and sets of task prices, fpE
i g
and fpW
i g, such that:
(i) Ec, Eo, Wc, Wo, D, pE
i and pW
i constitute a location equilibrium for every task i 2 [0;1]; and
(ii) agents maximize utility, ￿rms maximize pro￿ts, there is free entry, and factor markets clear.
Namely, equations (5) to (13) are satis￿ed.
Our next task is to characterize the patterns of specialization that can emerge in general equilib-
rium. Before doing so, we conclude this section by reporting the existence of a general equilibrium
for this economy.18;19
Proposition 3 A general equilibrium exists.
3 Patterns of Specialization
In this section, we explore the patterns of specialization and associated wages that can emerge when
o⁄shoring takes place between countries with similar relative factor endowments and technological
18The solution to the nine equations in part (ii) of De￿nition 2 is unique for given E, W and D. However, the sets
E, W and D are themselves determined by the equilibrium values of the other variables. This suggests the possibility
of multiple equilbria, which we discuss further below.
19Proofs of propositions not found in the text are provided in the Appendix.
17capabilities. We characterize the general equilibrium analytically and use numerical examples to
illustrate the outcomes that can arise.
We denote the world aggregate endowment of managers by ￿ H and the world aggregate endow-
ment of labor by ￿ L. We will consider the trade equilibria that can arise for various divisions of ￿ H
and ￿ L across East and West, always assuming that H=L = H￿=L￿. When East and West are equal
in size, L=L￿ = 1. When East is much larger, L=L￿ ! 1. We are interested in how the relative
size of the two countries a⁄ects the pattern of specialization and relative wages. It turns out that
the country with the greater output of the ￿nal good always enjoys a higher wage. We record this
result in the following lemma and use it repeatedly in our characterization of the equilibrium below.
Lemma 3 w > 1 if and only if nx > n￿x￿.
The magnitude of o⁄shoring costs￿ as captured by the parameter ￿￿ has an important bearing
on the nature of the general equilibrium. The following proposition characterizes equilibria for
economies with high o⁄shoring costs.
Proposition 4 There exists a ￿nite ￿NO such that for ￿ > ￿NO:
(i) there exists an ‘H > 1 such that for ‘H > L=L￿ > 1=‘H there is a unique equilibrium
characterized by w = 1, x = x￿, and n = n￿ for L=L￿ = 1; w > 1, x > x￿, and n > n￿ for
L=L￿ > 1; and w < 1, x < x￿, and n < n￿ for L=L￿ < 1.
(ii) as L=L￿ ! 1, any equilibrium is characterized by w > 1 and nx > n￿x￿. As L=L￿ ! 0;
any equilibrium is characterized by w < 1 and nx < n￿x￿.
We discuss this proposition with the aid of an example, as depicted in Figure 3. This ￿gure
shows equilibrium values of I;I￿ and J (in the upper panel) and of the relative wage w (in the
lower panel) for di⁄erent values of L. It is drawn for a large enough value of ￿ such that there is no
o⁄shoring between equal-sized countries.20 For ease of visual interpretation, we have distinguished
the outcomes that correspond to equilibria with w > 1 from those with w < 1; the former are
depicted with thick, dark curves, the latter with curves that are thinner and lighter in shade.
Proposition 4(i) implies that when o⁄shoring costs are su¢ ciently great, ￿rms in equal-sized
countries engage in no task trade. The economies of scale provide as always an incentive to con-
centrate tasks, because ￿rms are more productive when tasks are performed at world scale than
at national scale. But, when ￿ is su¢ ciently large, this potential source of productivity gain is
outweighed by the extra cost of performing tasks far from headquarters, even for the tasks that
are easiest to o⁄shore. The fact that I = 0 means that a potential equilibrium with concentrated
performance of task 0 in East would be upset by a local deviation to West. And the fact that
I￿ = 0 means that a potential equilibrium with concentrated performance of this task in West
would be upset by a local deviation to East. The only equilibrium in the location game for task
0 has dispersed location and production; i.e., Eastern ￿rms perform the task in East and Western
￿rms perform it in West. The same is true a fortiori for all tasks with indexes i > 0.
20The numerical example uses ￿ H = 2, ￿ L = 2, t(i) = 1 + i, A(X) = X
￿ for ￿ = 0:8, f = 1; ￿ = 2, and ￿ = 2.
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Figure 3: Equilibria and the Relative Size of Countries: High Offshoring Costs
( β = 2, σ = 2, θ =.8, f = 1)
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The remainder of Proposition 4(i) for L=L￿ = 1 follows readily from this observation. The
countries share the same technologies and the same relative factor endowments, and by the predicate
of the proposition, they are equal in size. With no o⁄shoring, if wages and scales of production
are the same, so too will be unit costs and optimal prices. With similar prices, ￿rms face similar
demands and make similar pro￿ts. So per-￿rm outputs indeed are the same in both countries and
the numbers of producers are the same as well. It is intuitive that there exists a fully symmetric
equilibrium in this case, which mimics the one described by Krugman (1979). The proof in the
appendix establishes the uniqueness of this equilibrium.
For ￿ large and L=L￿ close to but not equal to one, it is still true that the costliness of o⁄shoring
outweighs the bene￿t of agglomeration in both countries, even for task 0. Accordingly, I = I￿ = 0
when ￿ > ￿NO and East and West are relatively similar in size. There is no task trade, but the
19countries are not symmetric. The larger country has a greater scale of production and consequently
it is more productive in performing all tasks. The lower production costs spell lower prices, greater
factors demands, and greater pro￿ts. Of course, entry dissipates the higher pro￿ts and factor prices
adjust to eliminate excess factor demands. As Proposition 4(i) indicates, the larger country must
have higher wages, greater output per ￿rm, and more producers in equilibrium.
When L=L￿ is su¢ ciently large, however, some task trade must take place for any value of
￿. In the ￿gure, when L=L￿ is su¢ ciently large, J > I > I￿ > 0. According to Proposition
1, this con￿guration implies that all tasks with i < I￿ are performed in West and all tasks with
I￿ < i < I are performed in East, while those with i > I remain dispersed.21 The asymmetry
in size means that Western ￿rms stand to bene￿t greatly from performing the tasks (or having
them performed) in the same location as their more-numerous Eastern counterparts. They can do
so either by locating their capacity for some tasks in East or by procuring these tasks from East
under outsourcing arrangements. But notice too that the task trade can ￿ ow in both directions.
Indeed, we have two-way task trade in the example illustrated in Figure 3. When the Western ￿rms
perform or procure tasks from East, they create an incipient excess demand for Eastern labor. As
the Eastern (relative) wage rises, the ￿rms headquartered in East may ￿nd an incentive to locate
their capacity for some tasks in West, or to procure from there.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates another feature of equilibrium, as mandated more
generally by Proposition 4(ii). As L=L￿ grows large, the equilibrium wage is greater in the large
country than in the small country, even when task trade takes place. There are two reasons for this.
First, performance of the tasks with i > I is dispersed in equilibrium; the cost of o⁄shoring these
tasks is su¢ ciently great that all ￿rms prefer to perform or procure them in the country of their
headquarters. Since the larger country has a larger scale of output￿ as also required by Proposition
4(ii)￿ this country is more productive in performing these tasks. Second, the tasks with the smallest
o⁄shoring costs are performed in the smaller country while those with a moderate o⁄shoring cost
are performed in the larger country. This pattern of task trade lowers costs for the ￿rms in the
large country relative to those in the smaller country. The greater productivity of ￿rms in the large
country translates, in general equilibrium, into greater numbers of ￿rms and higher wages.
We turn next to settings with less onerous o⁄shoring costs, as arise when ￿ < ￿NO. The
following proposition characterizes the outcomes.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ￿ < ￿NO. Then there exists a ￿nite ‘L > 1 such that:
(i) If ‘L > L=L￿ > 1=‘L, there are multiple equilibria. In one set of equilibria, w = 1, nx =
n￿x￿, and the pattern of task trade is indeterminate. Generically, there also exist an equilibrium
with w > 1 and nx > n￿x￿ and an equilibrium with w < 1 and nx < n￿x￿:
(ii) If L=L￿ > ‘L or L=L￿ < 1=‘L, then w 6= 1 and nx 6= n￿x￿: As L=L￿ ! 1 any equilibrium
is characterized by w > 1 and nx > n￿x￿. As L=L￿ ! 0 any equilibrium is characterized by w < 1
and nx < n￿x￿.
21In this particular case, the tasks with i 2 (I
￿;I) are performed by Eastern ￿rms inasmuch as the Western ￿rms
locate their capacities in West. These ￿rms procure the tasks in this range from Eastern suppliers.
20Again we use a graphical example to aid in explaining the result.22 In keeping with the proposi-
tion, Figure 4 depicts three equilibria that exist when resources are almost evenly divided between
the countries. For H and L signi￿cantly greater than H￿ and L￿ (or vice versa) the equilibrium is
unique.
The various equilibria depicted in Figure 4 again are distinguished by the thickness and shading
of the curves. Consider the three curves in the top panel that are thickest and darkest￿ which
represent equilibria that have w > 1. Here, even when the countries are similar in size, some
o⁄shoring takes place. The fact that 0 < J < I￿ < I when L = L￿ implies that tasks with
i 2 [0;J) are carried out by all ￿rms in West, while those with i 2 (J;I) are carried out by all
￿rms in East. In this equilibrium, East has a higher wage and greater ￿nal output, despite the fact
that the two countries are identical in size and in all other (exogenous) respects. A qualitatively
similar equilibrium exists for all L ￿ L￿, as represented by the thick and dark curves to the right
of L = L￿ = 1.
But notice that the thick curves continue into the region where L < L￿ = 1. In other words, we
have an equilibrium in which the country that has the smaller factor endowment has the higher
wage and exports the tasks that have intermediate o⁄shoring costs. For L slightly smaller than
L￿ and w > 1, the ordering of the boundary values is J < I￿ < I, just as before. Again, West
alone performs the tasks with i 2 [0;J), East alone performs the tasks with i 2 (J;I), and both
countries perform tasks with i 2 (I;1]. East generates greater aggregate output than West (i.e.,
nx > n￿x￿) despite its smaller size and correspondingly smaller endowment of managers. The
shortfall in the number of its ￿rms compared to West (n < n￿ due to H < H￿) is more than
made up by greater sales per ￿rm (x > x￿). Because East has a greater scale of output, it enjoys
a productivity advantage in the tasks that are performed locally by all ￿rms. It also bene￿ts by
capturing the tasks that are more di¢ cult to o⁄shore among those that are traded. Its overall cost
advantage (c < c￿) underlies its superior sales per variety, which in turn justi￿es its higher wage
and the pattern of specialization.
The requirement for East to perform the tasks with intermediate o⁄shoring costs for producers
worldwide strains its small resource base. If L is very much smaller than L￿, East will lack the
workers it would need to perform a su¢ ciently large range of tasks that are relatively costly to
o⁄shore, and then its costs would not be low enough to justify its larger scale and higher wage.
In such circumstances, an equilibrium in which the smaller country has the higher wage and the
higher aggregate output does not exist.
The curves of medium shade and thickness depict a second equilibrium, analogous to the one
we just described except for the reversal of country names and so with w < 1. Finally, the ￿gure
depicts a third type of equilibrium that exists for exactly the same range of L and L￿ that admits
the coexistence of a thick equilibrium with w > 1 and a medium-thick equilibrium with w < 1.
For a given L and L￿ in this range, there exists a set of equilibria, all with equal wages in the two
countries. Equilibria of this type are represented in the ￿gure by the thinnest set of curves.
22Figure 4 adopts the same parameter values and technologies as Figure 3, except that ￿ = 1:1.
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Figure 4: Equilibria and the Relative Size of Countries: Low Offshoring Costs
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When wages are the same in the two countries, all tasks can be performed at lower cost in
whichever country has the larger scale of production. No task could be concentrated in the country
with the smaller aggregate output, because such an allocation would be undermined by a global
deviation to the country with the greater aggregate output. But if the countries are not too di⁄erent
in size and all traded tasks were concentrated in one country, then the two labor markets could not
both clear. It follows that an equilibrium with equal wages also must have equal aggregate outputs
(see Lemma 3); that is, nx = n￿x￿.
With wages and aggregate outputs equalized as they are in the equilibrium depicted by the
thin curves, there is nothing to determine the siting of any task for which specialization is viable.
Nonetheless, the unit cost equations (5) and (6) and the labor market clearing conditions (12) and
(13) determine the measures of traded tasks that are performed in each country and the aggregate
22o⁄shoring costs borne by producers of either nationality. Also, with w = w￿ and nx = n￿x￿, the
incentives for a deviant supplier to upset an equilibrium with concentrated task performance are the
same for both countries. Therefore, I = I￿ and this common value represents the boundary between
traded and non-traded tasks. The ￿gure shows M(E) and M(W) for the equal-wage equilibrium,
as well as I = I￿.
Although the equal-wage equilibrium has an indeterminate pattern of specialization, there are
two constraints on the allocation of the traded tasks. First, an equilibrium allocation must satisfy
T(E) ￿ T([0;M(E)]), because the total o⁄shoring costs for tasks concentrated in East must be at
least the cost of o⁄shoring the measure M(E) of tasks that are least costly to o⁄shore. Second,
the allocation of tasks must obey T(E) ￿ T([0;I]) ￿ T([0;M(W)]), because the o⁄shoring costs
for tasks concentrated in East can be at most the cost of o⁄shoring the measure M(E) of traded
tasks that are most costly to o⁄shore; i.e., it is maximized when the measure M(W) of tasks with
the lowest o⁄shoring costs locate in West. An equilibrium with equal wages in which the measure
M(E) of tasks that are least costly to o⁄shore is concentrated in East is identical to the limiting
equilibrium with w < 1 as w ! 1. And the equilibrium with equal wages in which the measure
M(E) of tasks that are most costly to o⁄shore is concentrated in East is identical to the limiting
equilibrium with w > 1 as w ! 1. This explains the convergence of the various thin and thicker
curves in Figure 4. When the gap between L and L￿ grows too large, one of the constraints must
be violated, and so the equal-wage equilibrium ceases to exist. The ￿gure shows that when this
equilibrium fails to exist, neither does an equilibrium exist in which the smaller country has the
greater wage.23
Let us recapitulate. Proposition 4 characterizes the general equilibrium when o⁄shoring costs are
high even for the tasks that are easiest to perform at a distance. The country with more resources
has higher wages, has more ￿rms, and produces more output per ￿rm. If the size asymmetry is
su¢ ciently great, there is task trade in equilibrium, possibly in both directions. In the example
we showed, the smaller country performs the tasks that are easiest to o⁄shore whereas the larger
country performs tasks with intermediate costs of o⁄shoring. Proposition 5 characterizes outcomes
when the schedule of o⁄shoring costs is lower. Then, if the countries are close in size, there are
multiple equilibria. In one set of equilibria, the countries have equal wages and equal aggregate
outputs. Generically, there also exist an equilibrium in which the larger country (in terms of
resources) has the greater volume of ￿nal output and the higher wage and an equilibrium in which
the smaller country has the greater volume of ￿nal output and the higher wage.
The equilibria with unequal wages that we have seen in our numerical examples share a common
23We o⁄er one further observation about the equal-wage equilibrium. Although our model lacks explicit dynamics,
the equal-wage equilibrium has a knife-edge property that suggests instability under plausible adjustment mechanisms.
Suppose we perturb such an equilibrium by misallocating a few tasks in such a way that total production costs in the
two countries remain unchanged. Then the labor markets will fail to clear, which will exert pressure on the relative
wage. As soon as the wage equality is broken, the remaining traded tasks will relocate so that those with low o⁄shoring
costs are concentrated in the low-wage country and those with intermediate o⁄shoring costs are concentrated in the
high-wage country. In other words, a small perturbation creates incentives for a large reallocation of resources and
moves the economy into the neighborhood of one of the two equilibria with unequal wages.
23pattern of task trade. In all of these equilibria, the tasks (if any) that are concentrated in the country
with the higher equilibrium wage are more di¢ cult to perform o⁄shore than those (if any) that are
concentrated in the country with the lower equilibrium wage. We have also seen in Lemma 3 that
the high wage country also has greater aggregate output. The following proposition characterizes
more generally the links between relative wages, relative outputs, and the allocation of tasks to
countries.
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium with w 6= 1, the pattern of specialization is characterized by
(i) concentrated performance of tasks with the lowest o⁄shoring costs in the country with low
wages and low aggregate output,
(ii) concentrated performance of tasks with intermediate o⁄shoring costs in the country with
high wages and high aggregate output, and
(iii) dispersed performance of tasks with the highest o⁄shoring costs in both countries.
The proposition does not exclude the possibility that no tasks are concentrated in one of the
countries, or that no tasks are dispersed; i.e., one or more of the sets E;W and D may be empty.
The pattern of specialization described by Proposition 6 holds intuitive appeal in the light of our
previous discussion. Tasks that are very costly to o⁄shore are performed locally, for obvious reasons.
For the other tasks, ￿rms in the country with the smaller aggregate output have the most to gain
from moving tasks abroad, while those in the country with the larger aggregate output have the
most to lose from the communication and coordination costs.24 Market forces drive the tasks that
are most di¢ cult to o⁄shore (among those that are traded) to the country with the larger aggregate
output to reap the cost savings. In the process, the wage there is bid up, creating incentives for ￿rms
in the high-output country to o⁄shore tasks that can readily be moved to the low-wage location.
Although this pattern of specialization conforms qualitatively to the dictates of global e¢ ciency,
allocation of some tasks will not be e¢ cient due to presence of national externalities, as we showed
in Section 2.2.
Proposition 6 leaves open the possibility that the performance of some tasks is concentrated in
one country but that no task is performed solely in the other. The extent of product di⁄erentiation
plays a crucial role in determining which country has the greater incentive to engage in o⁄shoring.
If, for example, ￿ = 2, then any equilibrium with task trade must have two-way task trade. In this
case, the set of parameters (besides ￿) for which I > 0 is exactly the same as the set of parameters
for which I￿ > 0. The reason is, perhaps, not transparent. A higher wage w directly increases the
incentive to o⁄shore in West compared to East. In fact it does so with an elasticity of 2, because
it boosts the incentive to o⁄shore in West while dampening the incentive to o⁄shore in East. But
a higher w also goes hand in hand with stronger scale economies in East (see Lemma 3), which
reduces the relative incentive to o⁄shore in West with an elasticity of ￿=(￿ ￿ 1): For ￿ = 2; these
24Aggregate output need not correspond to country size, as the smaller country may produce more per brand if its
lower costs generate greater demand. The equilibrium in Figure 4 in which the smaller country has higher wages is
one in which its aggregate output of ￿nal goods exceeds that in the larger country.
24e⁄ects exactly o⁄set one another, which means that the strength of the incentive to shift tasks
to the country with larger scale is matched by the strength of the incentive to shift tasks to the
country with the lower wage. When ￿ < 2, by contrast, there exists a range of relative country sizes
for which ￿rms in the low-wage country perform or procure some tasks in the high-wage country,
but not vice versa. And when ￿ > 2, there exists a range of relative country sizes for which ￿rms
in the high-wage country perform or procure some tasks in the low-wage country, but not vice
versa. In either of these situations, the direction of task trade is fully determined by the extent
of product di⁄erentiation, without regard to the other parameters or functional forms. We record
this observation formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose ￿ > ￿NO. Then there exists a set of values of L=L￿ > 1 for which: (i) if
￿ < 2, I > I￿ = 0; (ii) if ￿ > 2, I￿ > I = 0; and if ￿ = 2, I > 0 if and only if I￿ > 0.
We have also studied numerically the link between the pattern of specialization and the extent
of increasing returns to scale, the extent of product di⁄erentiation, and the size of o⁄shoring costs.
For a large set of parameter values we ￿nd that larger size di⁄erences between countries generate a
broader range of traded tasks and imply larger wage di⁄erentials as long as some tasks are performed
in both countries. Stronger external economies of scale and higher elasticities of substitution have
similar implications for the extent of production sharing and for relative wages. Not surprisingly,
a reduction in o⁄shoring costs induces more task trade and tends to improve welfare.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a theory of task trade between similar countries. When o⁄shoring costs are
not too high, ￿rms concentrate certain tasks in particular locations in order to realize external
economies of scale. The potential for outsourcing allows them to overcome some aspects of the
coordination problem inherent in this. Our theory predicts the pattern of specialization by task for
countries that di⁄er only in size. We ￿nd that there always exists an equilibrium in which the larger
country has higher wages and greater aggregate output of ￿nal goods. If o⁄shoring costs are low
enough and the countries are not too di⁄erent in size, there may exist another equilibrium in which
the smaller country has the higher wages and greater aggregate output. In either case, the country
with the higher wages and output performs the tasks￿ among those that are concentrated￿ that
are more di¢ cult and costly to o⁄shore.
Our main empirical prediction links the pattern of specialization in tasks to relative wages. To
test this prediction, we would need to identify the characteristics of tasks performed in di⁄erent
countries, which is by no means an easy thing to do. However, Autor et al. (2003) have shown
that it is possible to distinguish the tasks performed in a country using data on the distribution
of workers across occupations and information about the type of work performed by individuals in
each narrowly-de￿ned occupational category. They have measured the specialization of the U.S.
economy across ￿ve task categories: routine and manual, routine and cognitive, non-routine and
25interactive, non-routine and analytic, and non-routine and manual. Since the 1980￿ s, the United
States has been specializing more in tasks that are non-routine and either interactive or analytic,
and less in the other three categories of tasks.
Spitz-Oener (2006) has conducted a similar exercise using German data. She ￿nds that the
pattern of specialization across tasks has evolved similarly in Germany as in the United States,
except that Germany is performing more tasks that are non-routine and manual over time, unlike
the United States. The evidence supports the plausible conclusion that routine tasks are migrating
to low-income countries like China, India and Mexico, with the high-income countries specializing
increasingly in the set of non-routine tasks. But the evidence also suggests that Germany is spe-
cializing in a di⁄erent set of non-routine tasks than the United States, namely, those that are more
manual in nature. Given that Germany is smaller than the United States in terms of aggregate
output and it has lower wages, our theory predicts that it should specialize in tasks that are rel-
atively easier to o⁄shore. Our prediction accords with the available evidence to the extent that
(non-routine) manual tasks can more readily be organized and coordinated from a distance than
interactive or analytic tasks. This ranking of relative o⁄shoring costs seems plausible to us, but we
could ￿nd no direct evidence to con￿rm it.
Ideally, empirical research on task trade would begin by classifying tasks according to the
relative ease of o⁄shoring. More data on o⁄shoring are becoming available as awareness of this
phenomenon grows, so it may soon be possible to measure the o⁄shoring costs for di⁄erent tasks.
Once that is possible, it will also be possible to study the pattern of specialization by task. We
hope that our theory can help guide such e⁄orts.
5 Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 7.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equations (1), (3) and (2) de￿ne thresholds I; I￿; and J as continuous
functions of the two triplets (n;x;w) and (n￿;x￿;w￿): For values of w such that w 6= w￿; Proposition
1 uses these thresholds to determine uniquely the three sets fE;W;Dg as functions of (n;x;w) and
(n￿;x￿;w￿). Furthermore, M(Z) and T(Z) for Z = fE;W;Dg are continuous functions of the set
of thresholds (I;I￿;J) by the Theorem of the Maximum. We can then use the eight equations (5)
to (11) plus (13) to solve for n; n￿; x; x￿; s; s￿; c and c￿ as functions of the wage in East w, after
normalizing w￿ = 1. Substituting these solutions into what results from dividing equation (12) by
(13) yields an expression of the form ￿(w;L;L￿) = L=L￿, where ￿(w;L;L￿) denotes the relative
quantity of labor demanded in East as a function of the relative wage (given endowments). To show
existence, we need to guarantee that there exists a value of w (including, possibly, w = 1)such that
this equation is satis￿ed. Given that all expressions in the eight equations (5) to (11) plus (13) are
continuous in all variables, ￿(w;L;L￿) is continuous as long as w 6= 1.
For w = 1, the task allocation is not pinned down by Proposition 1. In this case, it must be
that nx = n￿x￿, because otherwise all tasks would be performed in the same country, which is
26inconsistent with equations (5) to (11). If, in fact, nx = n￿x￿ and w = 1, then any specialized
task can be concentrated in either country without being subject to a local or global deviation.
Hence I = I￿, but the location of tasks in [0;I] is not determined. Any division of these tasks
between countries that satis￿es (5) to (11) plus (13) is possible in equilibrium, and the particular
division determines some possible value of ￿(1).25 Consequently, ￿(1) is potentially an interval
and ￿(w) is potentially a correspondence. Since when w = 1 a division of tasks can always
replicate the allocation dictated by Proposition 1 for w & 1 or w . 1 (su¢ ciently close but not
equal to one), limw&1 ￿(w) 2 ￿(1) and limw%1 ￿(w) 2 ￿(1). Note also that if limw&1 ￿(w) 6=
limw%1 ￿(w); then any value between these two limits is also an element of ￿(1); since we can
choose fE;Wg arbitrarily as long as M(E) + M(W) = I. If I = I￿ = 0; so that E = W = ; then
limw&1 ￿(w) = limw%1 ￿(w) and so ￿(1) must be a singleton. Hence ￿(w) is a compact-valued
and upper-hemicontinuous correspondence that is single-valued except possibly for w = 1.
Figure A1: Existence of General Equilibrium 
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Clearly, limw!1 ￿(w) = 0 for all L and L￿, since limw!1 I ! 0 and limw!1 I￿ ! 1 so
that, in the limit, E and D are empty. Also, limw!0 ￿(w) = 1 for all L and L￿, since in that
case limw!0 I￿ ! 0 and limw!0 I ! 1 and so limw!0 E =[0;1], which implies that the left-hand
side of (13) converges to zero and so limw!0 ￿(w) = 1. The Intermediate Value Theorem as
applied to upper-hemicontinuous correspondences then guarantees that there exists a w such that
L=L￿ 2 ￿(w;L;L￿).
An example of an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence with these features, and the associated
equilibria, are presented in Figure A1. Panel (a) illustrates a case in which E = W = ; so that
￿(1) is a singleton and ￿(w) is continuous. Panel (b) in the same ￿gure illustrates a case in which
￿(1) is an interval and so multiple equilibria exist. The proof of Proposition 4 characterizes this
case further.
25We henceforth abbreviate ￿(w;L;L
￿ ) by ￿(w), while reminding the reader that the location of this relative
demand curve always depends on the two factor endowments, inasmuch as the factor endowments directly determine
n and n
￿ via (10) and (11).
27Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 3 guarantees existence of an equilibrium, the rest of the
proposition is proven in parts.
Part (ia): We ￿rst show that if H = H￿ and ￿ is high enough a symmetric equilibrium exists.
We then show that this equilibrium is unique. Since H = H￿, equations (10) and (11) imply that
n = n￿. Now consider a symmetric equilibrium with x = x￿ and w = 1. Then equations (1)
and (3) imply that I = I￿. Furthermore, the concavity of A implies that A(2nx) < 2A(nx) and
so ￿t(I) < 2. Let ￿NO = 2=t(0): Since t(￿) is an increasing function this implies that for any
￿ > ￿NO, I = I￿ = 0. So if ￿ > ￿NO, we obtain that E;W = ? and D =[0;1]. This implies that
the labor market clearing conditions (12) and (13) are given by ￿(nx) ￿ nx=A(nx) = L = L￿.
This equation is guaranteed to have a unique solution with positive output since A(0) > 0; A(￿)
is increasing and concave and limnx!1 A0 (nx) = 0; so ￿(￿) is a monotonically increasing function
with ￿(0) = 0 and limnx!1 ￿(nx) = 1. Equations (5) and (6) then imply that c = c￿ = 1=A(nx):
Hence in this case there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
To show, by contradiction, that this symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of this
economy for ￿ su¢ ciently high, suppose there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. Now suppose that
for any ￿, the asymmetric equilibrium exhibits E and W such that M (E) > 0 and M (W) > 0.
Then lim￿!1 T (E) = lim￿!1 T (W) = 1. But then equations (12) and (13) can only be satis￿ed
for x = x￿ = 0, which contradicts our assumption that we are in an asymmetric equilibrium.
Hence, there exists a ￿ high enough such that M (E) = M (W) = 0. Consider a value of ￿ such
that this is the case. Then equations (12) and (13) imply that ￿(nx) = L and ￿(nx￿) = L; which
given the assumption on A(￿) implies that x = x￿. A contradiction with our assumption that the
equilibrium is asymmetric. Hence, there exists a high enough ￿ such that the unique equilibrium
of this economy is symmetric and exhibits no o⁄shoring.
Part (ib): Fix ￿ > ￿NO and suppose that L=L￿ is such that M (E) = M (W) = 0. We will show
below that such an equilibrium exists and is unique. Combining equations (5) to (13) we obtain
that the equilibrium is implicitly determined by the following three equations, namely L = ￿(nx),
L￿ = ￿(n￿x￿) and x=x￿ = w
￿
￿￿1, where n = H=f and n￿ = H￿=f. As for part (ia), given L and
H, the ￿rst equation gives a unique solution for x, the second for x￿ and therefore the third for w.
Now nx = ￿￿1 (L) so for w to be increasing in L, given L￿ and L=H = L￿=H￿, we need ￿￿1 (L)=L

















In order for this allocation to be the unique equilibrium we still have to verify that there
exists an ‘H > 1 such that L=L￿ < ‘H the resulting nx and n￿x￿ imply that I = I￿ = 0 and so
M (E) = M (W) = 0. Since ￿ > ￿NO, ￿t(0) > 2: But note that as L=L￿ ! 1, the equilibrium
above implies that nx=n￿x￿ ! 1 and w ! 1; and so in the limit I = I￿ = 0. Hence there exists
some ‘H > 1 such that L=L￿ < ‘H implies that
A(nx+n￿x￿)
wA(n￿x￿) < 2 and
wA(nx+n￿x￿)
A(nx) < 2 and so
I = I￿ = 0.
28Part (ii): We now show that if L=L￿ is large enough then the equilibrium exhibits nx > n￿x￿
and w > 1 for any ￿. Take the limit as L=L￿ ! 1: Towards a contradiction assume that w < 1
and so n￿x￿ > nx. Then by equations 10 and 11, n=n￿ ! 1 and so it must be that x=x￿ ! 0: But
this requires c=c￿ ! 1. Note that by (5) and (6)
c
c￿ =
wM(E) + T(W) + wM(D)
A(nx+n￿x￿)
A(nx)
wT(E) + M(W) + M(D)
A(nx+n￿x￿)
A(n￿x￿)




















since M (D) > 0 which implies that I < 1 and so T(E) < M(E)￿t(I) < 1. A contradiction with
L=L￿ ! 1 and (12) and (13).
Proof of Proposition 5. For any values of L and L￿, Proposition 3 and Lemma 3 ensure that an
equilibrium exists and that whenever w 6= 1 either w > 1 and nx > n￿x￿ or w < 1 and nx < n￿x￿.
Here, we prove that there exists a ￿nite ‘L such that an equilibrium with w = 1 and nx = n￿x￿
exists if ‘L > L=L￿ > 1=‘L and does not exist if L=L￿ > ‘L or L=L￿ < 1=‘L. We then show that,
if an equilibrium with w = 1 exists for some factor endowments then, generically, equilibria with
w > 1 and with w < 1 also exist for these same factor endowments. The proof of the remainder of
part (ii) is identical to the proof of part (ii) in Proposition 4.
For ￿ low enough and H=H￿ = L=L￿ = 1, the existence of an equilibrium with w = 1 and
nx = n￿x￿ is immediate, because I = I￿ in such circumstances and we can let M (E) = M (W)
and T (E) = T (W). The low value of ￿ guarantees that M (E) = M (W) > 0. This implies,
using the notation for the relative demand for labor de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 3, that
￿(1) = 1 = L=L￿.26
Now consider the possible existence of an equal-wage equilibrium for L=L￿ > 1. If w = 1 and
nx = n￿x￿; we still have by equations (1) and (3) that I = I￿, and so we are free to choose E and W
in any way so as to satisfy the remaining equilibrium conditions. In particular, we need to choose
E and W so as to satisfy (12), (13), (5), (6) and (7). Together with 1 ￿ M(D) = M(E) + M(W);
R 1￿M(D)
0 ￿t(i)di = T(E) + T(W); and ￿t(1 ￿ M(D)) = A(2nx)=A(nx), we arrive at a system of
six equations in six unknowns. There exists an ‘L > 1 such that this system of equations has a
unique solution for ‘L > L=L￿ > 1=‘L: On the other hand, for L=L￿ su¢ ciently large there can be
no solution, because T (W) < M (W)￿t(I) < 2M (W) and so (5), (6) and (7) imply that
2 >
1 + T(W) ￿ M(W)








26Again, we will again write the relative labor demand as ￿(w) ,while stressing that this function depends on L
and L
￿, as well as on all of the other parameters.
29It follows that an equal-wage equilibrium cannot exist for L=L￿ > 2￿. Hence, there exists an
2￿ ￿ ‘L > 1 such that an equal-wage equilibrium exists for ‘L > L=L￿ ￿ 1 and an equal-wage
equilibrium does not exist for L=L￿ > ‘L. The case for L=L￿ < 1 is analogous and yields the result
that a set of equal-wage equilibria exists as long as L=L￿ > 1=‘:
It remains to show that, if ￿ < ￿NO and L=L￿ is such that a set of equal-wage equilibria
exists, then generically there also exist two other equilibria, one with w > 1 and another with
w < 1. Note that when ￿ < ￿NO and w = 1, E and W are not empty, which implies that
limw&1 ￿(w) 6= limw%1 ￿(w). To prove the result, it is su¢ cient to show that, in such circum-
stances, limw&1 ￿(w) ￿ limw%1 ￿(w), as depicted in panel (b) of Figure A1. If this is so, the fact
that L=L￿ 2 ￿(1) and min￿(1) ￿ L=L￿ ￿ max￿(1) implies that there exists a w < 1 such that
￿(w) = L=L￿. This conclusion follows by application of the Intermediate Value Theorem after
recalling from the proof of Proposition 3 that limw&1 ￿(w) 2 ￿(1); ￿(w) is continuous for all
w < 1; and limw!0 ￿(w) = 1. A similar argument guarantees that an equilibrium with w > 1
exists as well. Panel (b) of Figure A1 shows the three possible equilibrium values for w.27
We now show that limw&1 ￿(w) ￿ limw%1 ￿(w). The existence of an equal-wage equi-
librium implies L=L￿ 2 ￿(1): In such an equilibrium, nx = n￿x￿ and T(E) ￿ T ([0;I]) ￿
T ([0;M (W)]): When w & 1, Proposition 1 prescribes an allocation of tasks to countries such
that E = [M (W);I] and therefore T(E) = T ([0;I]) ￿ T ([0;M (W)]). Since the ratio of (12) and
(13) evaluated at w = 1 and nx = n￿x￿ is increasing in T(E) and decreasing in T(W), we conclude
that limw&1 ￿(w) ￿ L=L￿. A similar argument guarantees that L=L￿ ￿ limw%1 ￿(w). Hence
limw&1 ￿(w) ￿ limw%1 ￿(w).
Proof of Proposition 7. When H > H￿ and ￿ su¢ ciently large, the proof of Proposition 4
shows that the unique equilibrium is such that w > w￿ = 1 where w increases with H=H￿. Divide
equations (1) and (3) and use (12), (13) and H=L = H￿=L￿to obtain t(I)=t(I￿) = x=(xw2) when
M (E) = 0 and M (W) = 0. Substituting x=x￿ = w
￿
￿￿1 (see the proof of Proposition 4) we obtain
that t(I)=t(I￿) = w
2￿￿
￿￿1: Since w > 1, this equation can only be satis￿ed for I = I￿ when ￿ = 2.



















and so both countries start o⁄shoring for the same value of H=H￿. When ￿ > 2, (I)=t(I￿) = w
2￿￿
￿￿1
implies that t(I) < t(I￿) and since t(￿) is an increasing function we conclude that 0 = I > I￿,
which implies that East o⁄shores ￿rst as we increase H. If ￿ < 2, t(I) > t(I￿) and so 0 = I￿ > I;
which implies that West o⁄shores ￿rst as we increase H.
27Note that if L=L
￿ = min￿(1) then the argument only guarantees that an equilibrium with w > 1 exists, while
if L=L
￿ = max￿(1) it guarantees that an equilibrium with w < 1 exists. These cases arise only for sets of measure
zero in the parameter space. And, in either of these cases, there exist at least two equilibrium values of w.
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32Online Appendix for
"Task Trade between Similar Countries"
by Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
In this Online Appendix, we prove Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
Lemma 1 If w > w￿, either (i) ~ ￿(i) > 0 or ~ ￿(i) < 0 for all i, or (ii) J > 0 and ~ ￿(i) > 0 for i < J
while ~ ￿(i) < 0 for i > J.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume w > 1 (given w￿ = 1). The aggregate cost of performing
task i in East minus the aggregate cost of performing it in West is proportional to
￿(i;nx;n￿x￿;w) ￿ ~ ￿ (i;nx;n￿x￿;w)A(nx + n￿x￿) = (wnx ￿ n￿x￿) ￿ ￿t(i)(nx ￿ wn￿x￿):
First assume that n￿x￿ ￿ nx: Then nx ￿ wn￿x￿ < 0 which implies mini ￿(i;nx;n￿x￿;w) =
￿(0;nx;n￿x￿;w) since t0 (i) > 0 for all i. Then, since ￿t(0) > 1;
￿(0;nx;n￿x￿;w) > wnx ￿ n￿x￿ ￿ nx + wn￿x￿ = (w ￿ 1)(nx + n￿x￿) > 0:
So all tasks have higher aggregate cost in East; i.e. ~ ￿(i) > 0 for all i and J = 1.
Now suppose instead that nx > n￿x￿: Then wnx ￿ n￿x￿ > nx ￿ wn￿x￿. Suppose ￿rst that
￿t(0) > 1 is close enough to one that ￿(0;nx;n￿x￿;w) > 0: Then tasks in the neighborhood of
task 0 yield lower costs in West. Since t0 (i) > 0 for all i, either there exists J > 0 such that
￿(J;nx;n￿x￿;w) = 0, in which case tasks with i > J have lower cost in East (~ ￿(i) < 0) and tasks
with i < J have lower cost in West (~ ￿(i) > 0), or (wnx ￿ n￿x￿) > ￿t(1)(nx ￿ wn￿x￿) in which
case ￿(i;nx;n￿x￿;w) > 0 for all i and all tasks have lower cost in West (~ ￿(i) > 0 and J = 1). If
￿t(0) is such that ￿(0;nx;n￿x￿;w) < 0; then since t0 (i) > 0 for all i, all tasks have lower costs in
East, namely, ~ ￿(i) < 0 and J = 0.
Lemma 2 If w > w￿, then J < I implies I > I￿.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 guarantees that if w > 1 then n￿x￿ > nx implies J = 1. So we
can limit our attention to circumstances with nx > n￿x￿. To establish a contradiction, we suppose
that J < I and I￿ > I: Then (1) and (3) imply that w2 > A(nx)=A(n￿x￿):
From the de￿nition of J, we know that
￿t(J) ￿ ￿t(I) =
wnx ￿ n￿x￿




1Since the denominators are both positive for J 2 (0;1), the left-hand side has the same sign as
￿(n￿x￿;nx;w) ￿ w2A(n￿x￿)nx ￿ wA(n￿x￿)n￿x￿ ￿ A(nx + n￿x￿)nx + wA(nx + n￿x￿)n￿x￿
But then w2 > A(nx)=A(n￿x￿) implies that
￿(n￿x￿;nx;w) > n￿x￿ [A(nx + n￿x￿) ￿ A(n￿x￿)] + nx[A(nx) ￿ A(nx + n￿x￿)]:
De￿ne the the right-hand side as ￿(n￿x￿;nx) and note that ￿(￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable in
both arguments and ￿(nx;nx) = 0: Calculate the partial derivative of ￿(n￿x￿;nx) with respect
to the second argument. Then ￿2(0;nx) = 0 and ￿2(nx;nx) = A(nx) + nxA0(nx) ￿ A(2nx) ￿ 0;
where the inequality follows from the concavity of A(￿). Note also that ￿12(n￿x￿;nx) = ￿(nx ￿
n￿x￿)A00(n￿x￿+nx) ￿ 0; by the concavity of A(￿). Then, since ￿2 (￿) is continuous, ￿2(n￿x￿;nx) ￿ 0
for all n￿x￿ ￿ 0 and nx ￿ n￿x￿. Since ￿(nx;nx) = 0 and ￿2(n￿x￿;nx) ￿ 0 for all nx ￿ n￿x￿,
it follows by continuity that ￿(n￿x￿;nx) ￿ 0 for all nx ￿ n￿x￿. Hence, if w > 1, I￿ > I, and
nx > n￿x￿, we obtain that ￿(n￿x￿;nx;w) > 0; which implies by (15) that J > I. This establishes
our contradiction.
Lemma 3 w > 1 if and only if nx > n￿x￿.
Proof. We consider three mutually exhaustive cases: (i) I ￿ I￿, (ii) I < I￿ and L > L￿, and (iii)
I < I￿ and L ￿ L￿.
(i) From the de￿nitions of I and I￿, in (1) and (3), I ￿ I￿ implies
A(nx + n￿x￿)
wA(n￿x￿)




which implies that A(nx)=A(n￿x￿) ￿ w2 > 1. So nx > n￿x￿.
(ii) To establish a contradiction, suppose that nx ￿ n￿x￿. From Figures 3(d) and 3(e), I < I￿







which implies A(nx)=(nx) < A(n￿x￿)=(n￿x￿): But A(￿) concave, A(0) ￿ 0; and nx ￿ n￿x￿, imply
that A(nx)=(nx) ￿ A(n￿x￿)=(n￿x￿), This contradicts the supposition that nx < n￿x￿.
(iii) To establish a contradiction, suppose that nx ￿ n￿x￿. Labor-market clearing implies
L = (1 ￿ I￿)nx=A(nx) and
L￿ > (1 ￿ I￿)
n￿x￿
A(n￿x￿)
+ I￿ nx + n￿x￿
A(nx + n￿x￿)
;



































































which contradicts the previous string of inequalities.
3